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A recent and justly celebrated book asserts that ‘civil war is not a stupid thing’ (Cramer 
2006).  But is this true?  Armed conflict causes so much human suffering and material 
destruction that Cramer’s claim runs the risk of being dismissed without further discussion.  
In fact, the rapid development of the ‘costs-of-violence literature’ into a cottage industry of 
sorts is due in good measure to the conviction that civil war is not only a stupid, but also an 
awfully expensive thing.   
 
That war is a costly undertaking is beyond reasonable doubt.  In order to survive armed 
organisations at the very least need to feed, dress and arm their members, as well as to build 
up a logistic infrastructure and a system of communications. Their explicit objective is to 
destroy the enemy’s will to fight, in the canonical Clausewitzian rendering, but this implies 
killing and maiming people, blowing up infrastructure – in short, the wholesale destruction of 
human and physical capital.  The case for the stupid and expensive character of war thus 
seems to be overwhelming. But is this really so? Can ‘stupid’ be translated into ‘anti-
developmental’?  Would we want to make a general pacifist statement out of a belief that any 
kind of violence (or war) is stupid?  If not, then it is necessary to specify why civil, or any 
other specific type of war, is more (or indeed uniquely) stupid in contrast with other 
modalities of the use of organised violence. Until now, nobody has come up with such an 
argument.  If, on the other hand, we do want to make such a general statement, then several 
theoretical issues appear.  Some of the best extant explanations of state strength are based on 
the proposition that modern states are the children of the armed build-up of territorialised 
entities. According to this perspective, increasing internal and external violent challenges to 
their control over a given territory forced them to increase the number of people under arms, 
which buttressed both taxation and bureaucratic differentiation, leading to an enhancement of 
the initial expansionist drives each of those entities had, and so on. In sum, the model is one 
of a positive feedback process where war plays the role of a necessary condition for 
organisational development: ‘War made the state, and the state made war’ (Tilly 1975). The 
model has been formalised by political economists (Olson 2000) and appears to be supported 
by social historical research (Tilly 1992 and 2003; an early version of all this is Schumpeter’s 
fiscal state,  1951). “Tillian wars”, then, although terrible, are not a stupid thing.  
 
But can today’s conflicts be considered ‘Tillian’? An influential set of authors has suggested 
that in today’s globalised world Tillian wars are no longer possible (Kaldor 1999). Indeed, 
Tilly did not pretend that the conclusions he had crafted for Western Europe were universal; 
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and in some concrete contexts, such as Latin America, they have been challenged (Centeno 
2003).  Additionally, the policy implications of the findings of social historians, concerning 
the progressive role that war can play in state formation, may seem to be highly anti-intuitive 
and resistant to any sensible translation into the realm of policy action (though this is not 
necessarily true, see below).  But they do pose a serious methodological problem for the 
costs-of-violence literature: how can the consequences of violent events be accounted for in 
the long run2?  How can we show that wars are bad and costly, indeed stupid, for society (or 
how can we distinguish the stupid ones)?  
 
This paper evaluates the costs-of-violence literature in light of these questions. The main 
effects of conflict can be divided into two categories: efficiency and distribution.  With 
respect to the former, the main claim is that civil war (or any other form of massive violence) 
moves the economy of a given country away from the frontier of optimality.  It does this in 
several ways: firstly, by the very fact that war is destructive – lives, infrastructure and 
communications are wiped out in the maelstrom of conflict; secondly, by forcing the state to 
invest in military resources that it could have used otherwise, resulting in social and long term 
priorities falling to the bottom while the sheer survival of the state apparatus rises to the top; 
thirdly, by preventing fundamental reforms that the country may need, but that in an 
ambience of divisiveness and strife may become difficult or impossible; and finally, by 
generating opportunistic violence and illegality – while the state is occupied fighting rebels, 
other illegal actors may find space to develop their activities;  Justice is overwhelmed by the 
situation of conflict; and the borders are increasingly porous, and contraband thrives.  Thus, in 
many cases, there is a positive feedback loop between internal conflict and other forms of 
illegality, all of which converge on putting more and more stress on the state.  With respect to 
distribution, the basic idea is that civil conflicts hit the most vulnerable social sectors worst.  
Firstly, the rich can defend themselves (pressuring the state, establishing private collective 
action or simply fleeing) much better than the poor. The cost of looting the latter is much 
lower (they hold considerably fewer assets, but they are more numerous, have little possibility 
of fighting back or of acceding to private security and state security may be biased against 
them).  Second, precisely because the state is diverted from social policy, crucial egalitarian 
investment (for example, in education) may disappear.  Third, the disruption of social 
institutions and the implantation of the law of the strongest – a typical result of the 
disaggregation of the state – affects everybody, but differentially: those who have fewer 
resources to defend themselves individually, or through collective action, suffer the most. 
Obviously this is applicable not only to socio-economic cleavages, but also to other ones (for 
example, children tend to be brutally hit by conflict, as a result of direct aggression, 
destruction of families, recruitment, etc).   
 
This is the general landscape, and it should be noted that it combines a number of different 
types of assertion. Some are pure ‘statements of facts’ – internal conflict forces states to pay 
less attention to social policies – while others are evaluations of ‘states of the world’ – the 
economies of countries affected by conflict perform worse than others.  Though both seem 
very intuitive, this paper will demonstrate the difficulty in proving them, due to the problems 
involved in comparing very different contexts and outcomes in order to reach a general 
conclusion. I argue that there are in fact three ways of raising effectiveness and distributive 
issues: ‘bullionist’, that is by calculating the costs and benefits caused by armed conflict; 
‘deadweight’, in which an evaluation is made in terms of, for example, the loss in GNP 
growth that the society as a whole has suffered due to the conflict; and ‘distributive’, showing 
                                                 




how assets and income have passed from some hands to others.  I will claim that each of these 
entails very different methodological challenges, and that collapsing them into a single notion 
is a major, if quite frequent, mistake that tends to produce meaningless results. 
 
The paper is divided into five sections.  In the first section, I present some conceptual nuances 
which I believe are quite basic for a proper understanding of the problem, and which have 
been frequently disregarded even by technically sophisticated scholars.  I also develop ideas 
around the bullionist-deadweight-distributive distinction.  The second section discusses an 
assortment of some of the best examples from the costs-of-violence literature: internationally, 
and then applied to the conflicts of Colombia and Peru.  With respect to the international 
literature, I focus on a small number of key texts. The literature on costs of violence is already 
bulky, and I limit myself to discuss the main trends and ideas. Based on the literature review 
and conceptual discussion, in the third section I propose some adjustments to the general 
approach offered in the costs-of-violence literature. I follow this with a separate treatment of 
the distributional issues, before drawing some general conclusions. 
 
A reflection on conceptual and methodological standards 
The basic meanings 
Expressions such as  ‘costs of conflict’, ‘costs of violence’ and ‘costs of war’ can have at least 
three interrelated, but distinct, meanings. The first one is concomitant with the bookkeeping 
of the outlays, which both the state and its contenders have to incur to wage war. These 
‘bullionist’ exercises characteristically ask questions such as how much did this or that armed 
organisation invest in weapons, food or logistics, or how big were the rents that they captured 
through looting, ransom or expropriation. The second one is the measurement of the 
hypothesised economic ‘deadweight’ effect that violence and/or conflict have had on a given 
society: how much more, for example, would a given country have grown had it not been for 
its internal conflict? Please note that the deadweight perspective must be based on a 
counterfactual: if there had not been conflict, then what would have happened; or how many 
social goods did a given society forego for indulging in violent struggle? The third one 
focuses on the differential effects of war over key social sectors.  As with the other two 
meanings, this impinges not only on the evaluation of the social impact of conflict, but also 
on the probability of arriving at a peaceful settlement.3  
  
The first, bullionist perspective appears at first rather uninteresting – a problem for an 
accountant.  Actually, it is not as banal as it appears. On the one hand, it requires careful 
attention to the quality of the data, a dimension frequently obviated in the application of 
econometric techniques to social problems (Ball 1996 and 2001).  On the other, it has a direct 
linkage, unfortunately seldom highlighted, to Fearon’s rationalist puzzle.  Fearon’s basic idea 
(1984) is that if information about the relative strengths of the contenders is public and these 
are rational, wars should not take place, independently of the magnitude of the gains and 
losses implied. The underlying argument is both very simple and strong.  Rational agents will 
be able to deduce what the ex-post distribution will be, so the equilibrium outcome is that they 
are able to strike a bargain without incurring the costs of war.  The puzzle, then, is why we 
observe armed conflicts anyway.  To solve this by arguing that agents are not rational in some 
specific sense is not very interesting: first, because we are not dealing with the soldiers, but 
with leaders whose very business is strategising; and second, because we know that 
frequently the type of settlements Fearon hints should always take place are in effect 
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frequently arrived at (for example, Snyder 2004).  It is possible that the pattern of costs and 
rents is related to the probability of the onset and termination of the conflict (as in Snyder 
2004). Be that as it may, the existence of huge rents to capture does not explain automatically 
either the onset or the continuation of war.  A careful scrutiny of the assets and liabilities of 
state challengers might help understand the initiation and persistence of conflict.   
 
Unfortunately, an empirical approach to the second, deadweight effect is quite difficult; 
indeed, it is terribly destructive.  War and violence are tags attached to sets of thousands of 
correlated events that produce a multiplicity of effects. But as seen above, in the social history 
literature it has been found time and again not only that war can have developmental and pro-
growth side effects, but also that an anti-growth status quo can have worse long term effects 
than war itself, independently of the outcome of the latter – and this holds not only for Europe 
(Tilly 1992) but also for late developers (Moore 1993). Unaware of this, many contributions 
to the costs-of-violence literature take for granted the inexistence of positive externalities.  
Nevertheless, some of them are quite easily identified: Keynesian policies attached to military 
build-ups, road building, technological change triggered by military challenges, the 
strengthening of the state and the transformation of women’s position in the work force and in 
the public sphere, are some of the obvious examples.  It might be argued that: a) none of these 
effects are observed in today’s conflicts; or b) all of them introduce long-term distortions that 
are much more harmful than their supposedly positive short-term impacts. But that this is the 
case ought to be demonstrated, not assumed – though this is difficult to achieve4. In 
particular, it is very important not to abuse the ceteris paribus postulate. War is such a brutal 
and massive phenomenon that it changes nearly everything and each of these changes alters 
the future state of the economy.  As happens in other contexts, though much more radically 
(Przeworski 2003; North 2005), there is no way of summing up the aggregated results of such 
processes: a) because some of them develop in the very long term, and are beyond, and 
below, our capacity of observation; b) because there is no reasonable way of making an 
exhaustive list of them; and especially c) because the number of  potentially relevant control 
variables is infinite, such that we cannot specify by direct observation the state of the world 
had the conflict not occurred. For all these reasons, the only way to capture the deadweight 
effect is through counterfactuals (see, for example, Knight, Loayza and Villanueva 1999). 
This implies defining the status quo, and then creating tools to extrapolate it into the future5.  
The difference between the extrapolated status quo and what actually happened is the 
magnitude of the deadweight. In sum, the deadweight question boils down to how plausible 
and well built the counterfactual is.  Researchers can make a long list of the costs of the 
conflict, but if they are not able to build a viable counterfactual that exhibits the foregone 
growth, or social good that was not created, this would simply mean that in their observation 
of reality they skipped some relevant variables, thus failing to identify multiple side effects, 
some of them potentially pro-growth, that the conflict produced.  For example, in Colombia 
economists of the National Department of Planning have correctly stated that the internal 
conflict offers multiple opportunities for the illegal economy (basically coca) to develop, 
putting a substantial stress on the state (Sánchez 2003). But they have conspicuously omitted 
taking into account that the cash crop contributes substantially to the economy – between 3 
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and 5 percent of GNP, according to what appear to be the most reasonable evaluations 
(Cárdenas 2007) – and that several legal sectors benefit from its spillovers.   
 
The third, distributional problem is, at least from an abstract point of view, much easier to 
answer.  The transfer of assets can be tracked down, and the global impacts over specific 
social sectors evaluated.  The departure point that makes this question interesting is that the 
exercise of organised violence is prone to hit the most vulnerable groups much harder (Collier 
2003), and many examples show that this is precisely the case. But at least regarding the 
purely economic dimensions of conflict this is not the only possible scenario. Conceptually, 
the main challenge is not to ignore: a) the important ‘positive’ transfers, mainly the possibility 
that violence is associated with an egalitarian outcome or that it has egalitarian side effects by 
way of social incorporation (as in Latin American independence wars, or in the classical 
accounts of European state building); and b) the important ‘neutral’ transfers (that is, from 
rich to rich or from poor to poor).   
 
The differential effects can be of two types. First, repertoire-driven effects: depending on the 
type of actions carried out by the state and its challengers, some social sectors will be more or 
less affected.  In Peru, according to the Peruvian Truth Commission the fact that the Shining 
Path (Sendero Luminoso) built its strategic base in Ayacucho and neighbouring provinces led 
to an extreme over-representation of victims of a given ethnicity (cholos), a region (the 
Sierra) and a social class (peasants) 6.  In Colombia, the insurgency decision to fund its fight 
by kidnapping, hit the cattle ranchers very hard.  In the costs-of-violence literature it is 
frequently stressed that in a conflict the state will earmark resources for war that otherwise 
would have been concentrated on, for instance, social policies.  Looting and stealing by all 
actors are common place. More generally the destruction of assets – for example of the 
electricity infrastructure – can have distributional consequences, beginning with the obvious 
fact that they are regionally differentiated. Second, distributionally motivated effects: during 
the conflict (or as result of its termination), wealth is consciously transferred from some 
agents to others. For example, in Colombia there is strong evidence that the two waves of 
violence that occurred during the twentieth century produced an inverse agrarian reform and 
that some powerful actors consciously pushed for such an outcome. The conflict in South 
Africa and its negotiated end had distributional consequences, although less profound than the 
aspirations of those who fought for the abolition of apartheid. 
 
In sum, each of the three meanings is related to different questions, and entails identifying 
diverse methodological minima. The bullionist question can only be solved through careful 
accounting – here the main difficulty is to find reliable data and to be able to identify the key 
cash flows for each actor and for society as a whole. The deadweight question can only be 
dealt with through a counter-factual: what would have happened if there had not been 
conflict? Finally, the distributional problem implies identifying at least the main transfers of 
assets and flows of income that a given conflict has produced.  Each of these methodological 
minima implies its own challenges, of which researchers should be aware. The three questions 
are interconnected in the following way.  The deadweight exercise, if feasible, will give 
investigators an evaluation of what the society has lost by being at war.  This should guide 
bullionist researchers to refine their balance sheets; if they have identified a massive 
imbalance that is not captured by the deadweight, then they know that they have missed a set 
of important variables. Finally, deadweights and accounting for them should improve 
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substantially our understanding of both the impacts of the war over different sectors of 
society, and the pattern of rent generation and capture associated to war. 
 
If all this is true, no sensible conclusion can be arrived at when: a) the three questions are 
mixed up; b) the bullionist question is answered through unreliable or one-sided data; c) the 
deadweight question is not addressed through an appropriate and carefully constructed 
counter-factual; d) the critical base lines have not been identified; and e) the distributional 
effects are discussed without having identified previously the broad distributional landscape 
that frames the conflict. 
 
The signs of the externalities of war 
The notion that war can lead to positive change, or produce positive externalities, will no 
doubt sound contrived to policy and opinion makers, not to mention the overwhelming 
majority of Colombians and Peruvians.  This is not an idea that lends itself to direct policy 
translation, and  any attempt to do so would be suspect or whimsical (Luttwak 1999; Leander 
2004) 7.  However, this does not mean that the underlying notion is unsound or purely 
academic in the perjorative sense, although implementing it seems, on the surface of things, to 
be monstrously absurd, not only because of the ethical issues involved but also because the 
majority of the potentially pro-growth externalities of conflict are, as many other things in 
life, basically sub-products (Elster 1985) that can be attained only through indirect strategies. 
One cannot indulge in violence with the objective of building the state or boosting growth via 
the war economy, just as one cannot plan to be spontaneous8. It is probable that such a 
discussion will only reveal the severe limits of thinking of war in terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
But precisely because pinpointing such limits is extremely important, it is necessary to 
understand what I will call from now on the ‘anti-intuitive externalities’ of violent conflict. In 
other words, if the name of the game is cost-benefit analysis, then we should thoroughly 
respect the established rules, lest the exercise lose all its meaning; and the rules imply that the 
departure point is that it is possible that benefits for society as a whole, or for some specific 
sectors, do exist. No self-respecting firm would consider analysing its economic perspectives 
without a carefully constructed balance sheet that considers the basic scenarios.  When 
speaking in the name of the state, society or humanity, failing to do this seems  a tad careless. 
 
The anti-intuitive externalities of armed conflict can be both pro-growth and distributional, 
and can combine in several ways. Keynes (1987), for example, suggested that War World II 
had opened unprecedented opportunities for growth, due to both the opening of distributional 
possibilities and a pro-consumption re-education of economic agents.  Nobody would claim 
that in 1939 Keynes would have advocated going to war to produce those results, because the 
extra-economic ramifications were so incommensurably horrible.  The importance of Keynes’ 
remark is methodological: wars do not only produce costs and destruction, but also change the 
whole baseline, something that any sensible evaluation should take into account (see Table 1).  
Similarly, with regards to other violent incidents common in the contemporary world, such as 
                                                 
7 Indeed, Eward Luttwak’s paper (1999) was a pledge for “giving war a chance”, but though it did cause a stir it 
had no policy impact. The notion that Tilly’s studies of state formation are directly applicable to the 
contemporary world also do not hold (rather obviously). See Leander, 2004 
8 Though for slightly different reasons.  In the case of planning to be spontaneous, there is a logical 
contradiction.  In the case of creating violence to build the state, the means are not accessible (nobody would 
expose his life for such an abstract motive) and the outcome too uncertain (the probability of winning and 
surviving is much less than one). 
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invasions, researchers and policy makers typically focus on the trade-offs involved in the 
operation: for example, death and destruction against democratisation. 
Table 1: The other side of the balance sheet: a list of some key anti-intuitive externalities 
Externality Example 
Technical change Military industry, spill over into other branches 
Achievement of egalitarian political 
objectives through a repertoire of 
methods that includes violence 
South Africa, de-colonization 
Other forms of political inclusion Female enfranchisement 
Strengthening of the state Strengthened armies and police, more taxation 
Keynesian effects of military build-up State investment in public works through the army 
  
A panoramic review of the literature 
International 
The departure point of the best papers in the international literature is a clear, though with few 
exceptions (for example, World Bank 2007) implicit9, understanding of the different hues of 
the expression ‘costs of violence’ (or conflict), and the methodological implications this has. 
The majority of the papers focus on the deadweight and distributional meanings, and 
somewhat less on the bullionist perspective.  
 
Currently, there are two main ways of attacking the problem of deadweight. Firstly, by 
comparing the trajectories of countries in conflict with those that most resemble them, before, 
during and in the aftermath of war10.  The great advantage of such an approach is that it is 
simple, easily understandable and comparative. The counterfactual is that country Y would 
have roughly behaved like its similar counterparts X1, X2…, Xn, if Y had not had war. On 
the other hand, there are two main shortcomings. The first one is that, using this tool, the 
deadweight has been extraordinarily difficult to capture.  For example, Ammons (1996) finds 
no effect.  The second one is that ‘similar’ is a dangerous expression: similarities can hide 
great differences with respect to important variables. For example, Collier and collaborators 
have announced that armed conflict reduces the GNP growth by 2.2 percent (2003).  This 
result is taken from Collier (1999), where per capita GNP growth between 1960 and 1989 is 
utilised as a dependent variable, while the independent variables are how many months a 
country spent in war during a decade, how many months were spent in reconstruction and 
how many months preceded the initiation of war. A few control variables were also included 
(dummies for period, education, income per capita, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, and for 
being landlocked). Collier’s findings are suspect for various reasons, which underscore neatly 
the hidden dangers that the notion of similarity contains.  First, when comparing countries 
with or without conflict, they do not control for such fundamental variables as the weight of 
agriculture (or export-agriculture production) in the GNP11.  They also do not include 
dummies for region, which seems fundamental, and they collapse into the same category 
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10 Similar countries in all three periods. 




high, medium and low intensity conflicts, something that should not be done. In sum, the 
model may suffer from mis-specification, because it drops variables that theoretically seem 
quite important both for defining base lines (or departure points) and causation. In this sense, 
Lila Ammons’s (1996) exercise is more sophisticated. She establishes a comparison between 
32 African countries, divided in two categories: with and without war.  No deadweight was 
found through multivariate tests.12 Her conclusion (Ammons 1996: 77) is that:  
‘this analysis addressed the consequences of war on countries and the extent to 
which war accounts for the differences between non-warring and warring African 
countries’ development  patterns. While these results are not conclusive and imply 
that wars do not have long range consequences on overall development in Africa, 
they do offer some suggestions about the areas in which war may negatively 
affect Africa in that the non-warring African countries seem to have experienced 
larger increases in the number of children who lived beyond the first year of birth 
as well as larger increases in GDP than the warring African countries.’   
Nevertheless, multivariate tests did not yield any statistically significant difference between 
the two categories. Ammons suggests that this may be attributed to the fact that conflicts 
produce massive transnational migratory movements, which affect the neighbours of warring 
countries, pulling down the growth of the whole territorial cluster. This regional effect would 
make it more difficult to identify national deadweights. 
 
The second approach is not to take the counterfactual from real life examples, but to build it.  
There are several ways of doing this. This approach makes it possible to take into account 
explicitly the problematic nature of the notion of similarity and the issue of baselines. The 
disadvantage is that the counterfactual can become increasingly artificial, and difficult to 
evaluate. Nevertheless, I believe this is the best way to try to identify the deadweight. For 
example, Knight et al (1999), while focusing not on the costs of conflict but of military 
investment, try to answer several questions, of which the main one is whether there is a peace 
dividend for cutting military expense.  They start with a review of the costs-of-violence 
literature, acknowledging that until now it has failed to produce any clear evidence of the 
effects they are searching for. Then they define the ‘peace dividend’ as a: 
‘percentage difference between the level of real capacity output per capita that 
would result from a given sustained reduction in the military spending ratio, and 
the baseline path of capacity output that would have prevailed in the absence of 
such a reduction’.  
This is a typical deadweight question, and the authors came up with a very clever way to 
answer it.  They found that there is a significant and negative association between the ratio of 
military spending to the GDP as independent variable, and growth and investment. They then 
fed these coefficients into a neoclassical, Solow model of growth to calculate what would 
have happened if there had been lower levels of military spending: finding that growth would 
have been substantially better. I find this is by far the most attractive exercise done in the 
costs-of-violence literature vein, but it leaves at least three unsolved predicaments.  The first 
one is the model of growth itself.  It assumes that technology is exogenous, as Solow models 
do, and thus disregards completely the contribution of military spending to technological 
                                                 
12 Ammons suggests that univariate tests might reveal the presence of the deadweight, but does not elaborate. At 
any rate to replace multivariate tests by several univariate ones is suspect, and should be done only with great 
caution. But Ammons’s remark reveals a deeper problem, the instability of conclusions with respect to the 
technique that is used. If multivariate tests did not find any deadweight, but a list of univariate ones did, which 
conclusion should we choose? 
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change, which should be quite substantial13. This raises an additional redistributive question: 
do deadweights vanish or are they transferred? How much of the hypothesised 2 percent is a 
loss and how much is a transference from one nation to another?14 Second, although the 
association between the independent variable and growth is statistically significant and 
negative, it is only marginally so.  Third, due to missing data the authors present their results 
by decade, while an annual analysis might have yielded quite different results – something 
that is particularly relevant given the extremely small size of the association coefficient 
between military investment and growth.   
 
Colombia 
The present wave of Colombian internal conflict started in the late 1970s and continues today.  
Its main actors are the state, several guerrilla movements and paramilitary groups.  From the 
early 1990s there has been a growing concern with the costs of the conflict. The Colombian 
costs-of-violence literature has been spearheaded by the National Department of Planning, 
with many other state agencies, think tanks and NGOs chipping in during recent years (see, 
for example, DNP 1998).   
 
There are two deadweight papers that deserve attention, especially because they converge on 
their main conclusion: Colombia suffered an economic slump from the early 1980s, caused by 
the conflict.  The first one (CEDE, 2003) illustrates this very well, using a graph that maps, 
department by department15, the rates of growth in the 1960s and 1970s versus those of the 
1980s and 1990s.  The 45º line is where the growth rates were equal, so that points below the 
line are the departments where growth was higher in the early decades. The majority of 
departments fall below the line, which means that after the onset of war the economy slowed 
down. Cárdenas (2007) wants to make the same point using a more sophisticated tool, by 
trying to capture the effect of an exogenous shock that, he hypothesises, was the initiation of 
the conflict. The common problem of both exercises is that they completely neglect what was 
taking place beyond the country in that period, with the whole of Latin America cooling down 
economically in the 1980s. In fact Colombia fared better than the Latin American average. 
Growth rates were better in the country in the 1960s and 1970s, but this is no exception16. 
Latin American countries can be categorised between those in which agriculture predominates 
in the GNP, and those that are more industrialised. According to this categorisation, Colombia 
would pertain to the first set, which fared poorly from 1980 on. Colombia was an agricultural 
country that did relatively well, above the average. Would this allow us to infer that thanks to 
the conflict the country was protected from an exogenous shock that affected others much 
more severely? On the contrary, it would rather suggest that in Latin America agricultural 
structures may be the true underlying deadweight, an intuition that sits well with both 
quantitative (Collier 2003) and historical-qualitative (Moore 1993) studies.  
 
All the Colombian bullionist exercises proceed according to the following algorithm: 
 
1. Create the most complete list of social wrongs generated by the conflict (or by a 
particular practice, like kidnapping), both with respect to growth and distribution; 
                                                 
13 Of course, wars that buttress technological change and innovation are particularly atrocious; here I am 
restricting myself to the purely economic effects. 
14 Practical politicians, contrary to academics, are quite aware of these kinds of issues. Weaver (1974) reports 
that, when Nixon was requested to put a ceiling on the sale of weapons to Latin America, he retorted that the 
only result of this would be a sacrifice of US jobs. 
15 In Colombia the department is an administrative unit above the municipality but below the nation. 
16 The only true exception is Chile, where things occurred the other way round. 
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2. Evaluate the rents captured by non-state armed actors; 
3. Estimate the monetary value of the list of social wrongs, and deduct it from the GNP; 
4. Arrive at an estimation of the aggregated losses. 
 
This means that they share the following problems: 
 
1. Not one  separates analytically the three dimensions of the costs of violence.  As seen 
above, to make a list of costs and then deduct them from the GNP as a deadweight is 
simply wrong. Besides, the results of such exercises are extremely unstable.  For 
example, they range from an estimated 2 percent to a full 15 percent in loss of GNP 
growth due to the existence of the conflict (Rubio 1995) 17. 
2. They fail to take into consideration the complexity of the externalities of the conflict.  
For example, there are the claims that the conflict has increased the chances for illegal 
actors, like drug cartels, to act (Sanchez 2003; Collier 2003). This entails a cost for the 
state, in the form of illegality, increased investment in security and justice, foregone 
tax revenue, etcetera.  But the other side of the coin is the contribution of coca 
production to the economy, which according to the most conservative and reasonable 
estimates is around 3 or 4 percent of GNP. Tillian effects (in which sense is money 
invested on justice lost?) are also disregarded. 
3. There is a tendency towards making unsubstantiated claims.  For example, Martinez 
(2001) suggests that one of the indirect costs of the conflict is the deterioration of the 
legitimacy and credibility of the state.  This may or may not be true generally, but in 
Colombia there is no evidence whatsoever that one of the long-term results of its war 
is decreased state legitimacy.  According to several opinion polls, the contrary may in 
fact be the case: in the regions where the conflict has historically been more intense, 
people ask for more state presence, although this is probably selective (they want 
some agencies and not others, following a historical trend). 
4. Reckless use of figures can also be seen. Good and bad estimates can be different by a 
factor of three or four, as the cases of Peru and Colombia reveal below. For example: 
to assess the economic impact of kidnapping, the DNP utilised the figures of the 
federation of cattle ranchers, which – as recognised by the federation itself – are very 
unreliable; to assess the impact of displacement on the state, the entire special budget 
dedicated to displaced people was taken as a cost in Pinto(2004), omitting the fact that 
in any case the majority of displaced peasants were poor, and thus would have been 
targets of diverse social policies; and there is no agreement about the true number of 
internally displaced persons.  
5. Neglect of the anti-intuitive externalities of the conflict: while the list of its negative 
consequences is long, the other side of the coin has been carefully avoided.   
6. Confusion of normative and economic perspectives and enthusiastic but hazy political 
correctness.  For example, some authors tag narcotrafficking as ‘unproductive’ 
without specifying in what sense it is (Pinto 2003).  Others include in the accounting 
of costs negative externalities such as the destruction of the environment (Perez 2002). 
                                                 




While this may be a relevant consideration, nevertheless environmental costs are not 
included in Colombian national accounts, so they will not affect the GNP figures18.  
 
Bluntly put, with the techniques used up to now to estimate the costs of the Colombian 
violence, any conclusion is possible.   
 
Peru 
The Peruvian conflict started in 1980 and drew to a close in 1991, after the leader of the main 
guerrilla organisation, Shining Path, was jailed for life. It was more virulent than the 
Colombian, but much shorter and more territorially circumscribed. Far fewer denominations 
participated in it: only two guerrilla organisations, and no well armed paramilitary groups, at 
least not in the form that they are known in Colombia.19 The Peruvian conflict seems to be a 
canonical example of what the costs-of-violence scholars are looking for.  The 1980s was a 
decade of brutal warring and socio-economic trauma, and was followed by stabilisation, and 
growth the prerequisite for which was, according to the policy makers, the elimination of 
Shining Path. 
 
Contrary to the Colombian literature, the Peruvian costs-of-violence literature is small, 
basically due to the fact that the conflict ended before the theme became highlighted. Data 
production and quantitative analysis were much less developed in the country when the 
conflict was taking place than they are today.  The few papers that can be found focus on a 
preliminary assessment of the economic implications of the loss of human lives (see, for 
example, CVR 2003 and Comisión Especial del Senado 1989) 20.  They are similar to the 
Colombian bullionist exercises, separating direct and opportunity costs, without inclusion of a 
detailed balance sheet. Frequently basic information (for example, the costs calculated in 
constant or current units) is not provided.  
 
However, the Peruvian case has one extremely relevant lesson for the costs-of-violence 
literature: we should be very concerned about the quality of the data, and understand clearly 
that in some situations it is impossible to draw statistical inferences from certain data sets. I 
think a consensus on this problem can start from the following premises: first, marginal or 
relatively small amounts of noise (wrong, incomplete or vague information) may not be so 
terribly damaging provided the conclusions are robust; second, transforming imperfect data 
(by logarithmic or categorical transformations, for example) is frequently a good solution, and 
missing data issues are also treatable; and third, quality problems cannot be waived away, 
because sometimes they do become quite serious. What the Peruvian case shows is that a 
naïve approach to the issue of quality can produce conclusions that are significantly 
inaccurate.  While in Colombia one suspects that in many situations the data is critically poor, 
in Peru it was possible to actually demonstrate that this was so, and to what degree. When 
studying violence, researchers seldom have at hand censuses, or random samples. Instead, 
they have ‘convenience samples’, which are deeply biased.  Because they are not random, 
convenience samples do not fulfil even the minimal requirements to be submitted to statistical 
treatment, and inferences based on them are spurious. The best tool to unbias the analysis is 
                                                 
18 Some authors do understand that these types of mistakes should be avoided. See for example 1998. 
19 Some special army units performed terrorist operations against the opposition and population.  The state and 
the army buttressed the creation of peasant Defence Committees, but these acted as a civilian support base, not 
as an armed actor. 




multi-systems estimation, a refinement of capture-recapture techniques that needs at least 
three samples and a set of technical preconditions (allowing the possibility of matching cases) 
to be used (see, for example, Ball 1996 and 2001).  The Peruvian Truth Commission had 
adequate data sets, and commissioned a work to establish a reasonable approximation to the 
real number of casualties caused by the conflict.  The figure jumped from more than 20,000 
as initially found in the data sets to nearly 70,000 (Truth Commission (2003).  This is a case 
of brutal under-estimation, but of course because of the deeply political nature of issues 
related to violence, gross over-estimations can also happen.  The message is simple: when 
evaluating political homicides, kidnappings and other types of violent events, the quality of 
information and inferences should be treated carefully. 
 
Reconsidering the cases 
The deadweight perspective 
What is the size of the Colombian and Peruvian deadweight?  Colombia showed a relatively 
good performance in the 1980s, which was a ‘lost decade’ for the rest of Latin America.  
From then on, it has achieved above-average growth.  Three statistical exercises were 
performed to see if this was idiosyncratic. First, following CEDE (2003), a comparison was 
made of Latin American growth rates over two periods (1960-1970 and 1980-1990).   If 
Colombia had grown at the average Latin American, or Latin American rural, rhythm, it 
would have fared worse than it actually did.  If Peru had grown at the average Latin 
American, or Latin American rural, rhythm, it would have had a basically  identical 
performance.  Several statistical tests using different counterfactuals and techniques were 
performed, and not one suggests the existence of a deadweight. Second, a MANOVA 
(multivariate analysis of variance), basically repeating the Ammons (1996) design, was 
employed.  A set of ‘control’ countries with a similar level of development and type of 
economy, and which had not experienced war, was established (Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay), and compared to a second set up of countries that did experience 
war (Colombia, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala). The results showed that the 
differences between them were not statistically significant (Tables 2 and 3). Actually, there 
are some anti-intuitive results related, for example, to foreign investment, although these 
might be idiosyncratic.  A panel exercise for the period 1980-2006 was made, separating 
countries that had, and had not, internal conflict. Table 4 shows that there are no statistically 
significant differences with respect to growth.  
 
 Table 2: 
 
Effect  Value F Hypothesis Gl Error Gl Significance 
Traza de Pillai 1,728 4,759 8,000 6,000 ,037
Wilks´ Lambda  ,006 6,219(a) 8,000 4,000 ,048
Traza de Hotelling 47,168 5,896 8,000 2,000 ,153
Violence 
Roy´s Major Root  44,170 33,127(b) 4,000 3,000 ,008
 a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistical is F´s superior limit that offers an inferior limit to the significance level 





GDP growth Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Violence 0.352 0.796 0.44 0.658 -1.208 1.913 
FDI net 0.000 0.000 0.17 0.865 0.000 0.000 
Gross savings 0.021 0.039 0.53 0.594 -0.055 0.096 
Services -0.009 0.048 -0.2 0.844 -0.103 0.085 
Trade 0.007 0.011 0.61 0.542 -0.015 0.028 
Agriculture 0.032 0.056 0.57 0.566 -0.078 0.142 
Manufacturing 0.007 0.065 0.11 0.909 -0.119 0.134 
Mortality -0.032 0.014 -2.3 0.021 -0.060 -0.005 
Constant 3.349 3.798 0.88 0.378 -4.095 10.793 
  
Table 4 : Panel Para Latinoamerica 1980 - 2006 
 
Dependent Variable  Growth GDP  Growth GDP Growth GDP 
Conflict -1.3382  
(significant to 5%) 
-0.1537   0.3520   (0.7961) 
Agriculture   -0.0095   0.0322   (0 .0561) 
Gross Savings     0.0205    (0 .0385) 
FDI     1.42e-11   (8.33e-11) 
     
Services     -0.0094   (0.0479)     
Trade     0.0067  (0.0110)      
Manufacture     0.0073   (0.0645)      
Mortality     -0.0324  (0.0140)*     
Constant 2.838235   2.9553 (significant)   3.3494   (3.7980)      
Rho  0    0 0.04056981    
Wald 0.0340 0.9276 0.3601 
 
 
The lack of a deadweight is a puzzle in itself.  Perhaps the opportunities that the conflict 
offers to illegal agents explains part of it (see below).  Please note that a rough comparison 
between Peru’s behaviour in the 1980s and the 1990s would suggest a sharp difference in 
favour of the latter.  But this shows nothing, as the gist of the problem is the actual 




                                                 
21 In other words, we should not compare actual Peru in 1980 with the actual Peru in 1990, because there are 
potentially infinite confounding factors. In the Peruvian case it is particularly obvious that the behaviour of 
growth was much more associated with economic policies than with the zigzags of the conflict – plugging in a 
dummy for policy and a small time lag has much more explanatory power with respect to growth than anything 
else. We have to compare the actual Peru with a counterfactual Peru in the 1980s, actual and counterfactual in 
the 1990s, and so on. 
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The bullionist perspective 
How should the bullionist perspective be built?  I would advocate four complementary ways 
of dealing with the problem: 
 
a) The operations involved should be guided by an explicit criterion of relevance. If the 
main interest is to contribute to the analysis of the impact of the conflict on growth22 
then only items that appear in the national accounts should be considered.  
b) Side effects ought to be taken into account.  Let us discuss the attacks against the 
national infrastructure in Colombia.  It may be the case that sometimes they produce a 
reaction – in the form of investment and expansion – that more than offsets the initial 
destruction. For example, if a road is destroyed it may be the case that the state 
rebuilds it and creates a supporting network to permit the rapid access of troops in 
case of future attacks.  The cost of attacks against the infrastructure in Colombia 
between 1985 and 2004 was 335,197.28 million pesos (nearly 168 billion dollars). 
Making a bivariate correlation between attacks against the infrastructure (the violence 
variable) and public investment in it, we can obtain an estimator of this ‘anti-intuitive 
externality’. Once it is calculated we can indulge in the standard reasoning – given the 
coefficient B, we propose that one percent increase in attacks increases investment in 
B.  Then we multiply this by the delta of yearly growth of costs, and subtract it from 
the delta of yearly growth of investment.  The simple formula is presented in Table 5, 
whilst the results are shown in Table 6 and it can be seen that while a fair amount of 
destruction appears to have produced no anti-intuitive externality in transport 
infrastructure, the opposite seems to be the case for electrical infrastructure.23 
 
Table 5: 
Component Cost Net effect 
Infrastructure 335197.28 
million pesos 
(∆ Cost) – (B* ∆ infrastructure investment) 
 
                                                 
22 As said above, this is always only a secondary tool, as the deadweight counterfactual is indispensable, even if 
the bullionist exercise is done well. 
23 As said above, the Peruvian case counts on worse data (it was shorter, it took place before costs-of-violence 
literature became important, etcetera). Curiously enough, though, using a proxy for investment (installed 
electrical capacity), in Peru the response to terrorist attacks in the electrical sector would also seem to have more 




In million pesos at  2004 rate 
 
 Net cost road Infrastructure 




electrical sector Net infrastructure effect
1987 0.00 0.00 181.10 181.10
1988 0.00 0.00 265.59 265.59
1989 0.00 0.00 59.73 59.73
1990 0.00 0.00 -601950.18 -601950.18
1991 0.00 0.00 -192118.17 -192118.17
1992 0.00 0.00 -55820.30 -55820.30
1993 0.00 0.00 -377316.12 -377316.12
1994 8773.75 42919.43 -492913.70 -441220.52
1995 0.00 0.00 -692123.73 -692123.73
1996 0.00 0.00 43137.49 43137.49
1997 25834.67 93005.80 1113790.59 1232631.06
1998 24407.38 18711.56 -851731.41 -808612.47
1999 22830.22 4098.46 87004.81 113933.49
2000 38074.03 19281.65 -394730.98 -337375.29
2001 8486.60 0.00 1412303.27 1420789.87
2002 26220.17 0.00 -19437.22 6782.95
Total 154626.8157 178016.9088 -1021399.23 -688755.5009
 
c) Indirect impacts act in different directions.  As noted above, the indirect impacts of the 
conflict have been counted in a very one-sided way.  For example, the argument 
according to which the presence of a conflict opens windows of opportunity to a huge 
amount of opportunistic illegal activity is irrefutable.  These undertakings are a cost to 
the state. But at the same time they contribute to the economy in two ways: as an 
activity in its own right, and through spillovers that feed the legal sectors.  Both 
dimensions should be captured24. If this is done, the results are different from what 
Colombian and Peruvian scholars normally conclude. The contribution of conflict to 
GNP growth – through facilitating narcotrafficking as in Peru, or directly promoting it 
as in Colombia – may have been positive in both countries, though this conclusion of 
course will depend on the quality of the guesstimates of the weight of narcotrafficking 
in the economy.   
d) The expansion of the security sector has to be evaluated. It impacts on the 
development of infrastructure and employment (as is also the case with armed 
challengers), but it also has a territorial dimension that is not captured well by 
standard economic studies (due to the armed challenge the state is forced to establish 
its presence in places where it had been regularly absent).  Once more, taking this into 
account bullionist calculations do not sit well with conventional wisdom. 
e) Other state policies should not be assumed away.  The standard claim is that the 
conflict forces the state to divert resources from social policies to military investment. 
                                                 
24 This does NOT contradict point (a).  Narcotrafficking is not counted in the national accounts, but it is relevant 




In Colombia, this does not hold: not only has the country’s social investment been 
permanently above the regional average during the conflict (see Figure 1), but the 
military investment took a very long time to grow; when it did, the health and 
education budgets were not deflated.  This may be quite idiosyncratic (US military aid 
may have allowed social spending to continue), but the general point is not: the state 
reacts in different ways to armed challenges, and one of them is combining repression 
and redistribution (which is also true in Peru and El Salvador, among many other 
cases).   
 
Figure 1.  Level of social investment in the Andean region  
 
 
Source: Calculations based on CEPAL, PANORAMA SOCIAL DE AMÉRICA LATINA, 200525 
 Spss graphic 
 
Distributional problems 
For many reasons it can be comfortably conjectured that wars affect the poorest and the most 
vulnerable. First, they are the most likely candidates to be cannon fodder. Second, they have 
no capacity to pay private security, so their assets and income can be looted by warlords. 
Third, and following the same logic, they seldom, if ever, are able to pay for private access to 
electricity, education, health, etcetera, when state infrastructure is destroyed.  If they ever 
leave the battlefield, they end up in refugee camps. This is a very important part of the story, 
but there are many other ones.  Armed conflict – whether initiated by the state or the rebels – 
can have distributional objectives, as in South Africa, the US civil war and the communist-
agrarian revolutions of Asia.  Sometimes, large quantities of wealth are passed from the rich 
or the middle class to the poor (especially the rural poor).  Risk prone, or unlucky, poor 
people that join an army may have previously been unemployed. If the assumption that this 






always, or generally, holds (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) is clearly unwarranted (Gutiérrez 
2008), it may sometimes happen.  More substantially, getting enlisted is in many contexts a 
very central, sometimes the only, channel for upward social mobility.  During the Latin 
American independence wars, but even today  – for example, US recruitment for the Iraq 
conflict – thousands of people joined the army to become enfranchised and acquire full 
citizen status. In Britain, women obtained the right to vote in return for their participation in 
the war effort26.   
 
How can all this be put together? A distributional analysis of the conflict should identify at 
least the following dimensions: 
 
a) Programmatic effects – sometimes the combatants intend to take over the assets, 
income or political rights of their adversaries or third parties; 
b) Incentive systems – to boost combat morale, to mobilise different sectors of the 
population, the state and its challengers distribute prizes and punishments. It may be 
the case that the state, the challengers, or both, are warring about rents; 
c) Patterns of action – even without being conscious of changing the state of the world in 
a certain direction, armed actions can generate radical changes that in turn produce 
massive redistribution; 
d) Organisational structures – the type of organisation that participates in a conflict is a 
crucial variable, and can have long-term implications over the patterns of distribution 
that prevail in a given country; 
e) Base lines – conflicts do not take place in a distributional vacuum.  For state 
challengers, the ability to lure recruits into their ranks and to promote high-risk 
collective action depends on the existence of a disaffected, and/or risk-prone critical 
mass. 
 
The first two are distributionally motivated, the next two are repertoire driven and the last one 
constitutes the socio-economic and institutional dimension.  Keeping in mind the different 
types of distributional dimensions, let us turn our attention to our case studies. 
 
Colombia 
Due to its conflict, Colombia has suffered an inverse agrarian reform in the last twenty years. 
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. Their lands were taken over by 
guerrillas and landlords, but in particular by the paramilitary.  Despite the fact that this is 
quite visible and constitutes a serious and unresolved policy problem, no consensus has been 
arrived at with respect to how many people have been displaced in Colombia. The estimate of 
the true number of victims has been fraught by technical and political difficulties. The 
difference between the figures offered by the state and by the main NGOs is sharp (see Figure 
2). The human capital lost – which has been estimated in different manners by the Planning 
Department and other agencies – also mainly hurts the poor.   
                                                 
26 Note the difference with South Africa.  Here the reason for the conflict was enfranchisement and equality for 
Blacks.  The war waged by Britain against the Nazis was not about the political rights of women, but it offered 
the motive and the context to institutionalise them. 
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Figure 2. Displaced people data sets in Colombia: contradictory assessments 
 
 
Source: Gonzalez (2007) Master’s degree dissertation 
 
This is by far the main programmatic result in Colombia, though there are others.  The 
country has been at war for more than three decades, and over the same period there have 
been ongoing peace negotiations. Those which have come to fruition have almost always had 
distributional clauses, mainly with regional emphases.  Much more serious are the 
consequences of targeted policies, designed specifically to tame violence through the 
provision of services to the population.  It can be shown that these ‘prophylactic’ designs 
were already an obsession of the country’s policy makers long before the onset of the present 
wave of conflict. Perhaps the best example of this is the Plan Nacional de Rahabilitación 
(National Plan for Rehabilitation) that intended to combat violence by fighting poverty. The 
Plan was issued is 1982, and tried to target the poorest municipalities to prevent violence.  
After it ended, its programme was assumed by other agencies; and it appears that there as an 
association between investment and transferences from the central state to subnational units 
between 1990 and 2005, and violent events (Figures 3 to 6) as captured by four databases 
(Table 9 to 11).   
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Figure 3: Annual weight: Political Violence rate for 100 thousand habitants vs Net 








Figure 4: Annual weights: Common homicide rate per 100 thousand habitants vs. Net 






Figure 5: Annual weights: Expelled displacement rate for 100 thousand habitant vs Net Social 




Figure 6: Annual weights: Massacre victims rate for 100 thousand habitants vs Net 




Variable Source Temporality 
Forced displacement Acción Social 1990-2005 
Political Violence Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín 1990-2005 
Massacre victims DNP 1990-2005 
Common homicides  DNP 1990-2005 
Social investment transfers DNP 1990-2005 
 
 
In three cases (displacement, political homicide and massacres), the relationship is 
decreasing: the number of violent territories (municipalities where more homicides take 
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place) decreases.  There is one exception: common homicide, where violent territories 
increase.  I would draw two conclusions from this. First, the state ‘sees’ selectively those 
critical indicators that can and should be responded to, not only with force but with 
investment.  This is related to both political perception (notions of order, how visible the 
problem is, etcetera) and feasibility (sometimes investment is not possible, or it is difficult, 
for lack of bureaucracy, loss of control, etcetera).  Second, changing the proxies can change 
the sense of the association. No amount of care is enough in this realm. 
 
The Colombian costs-of-violence literature has been keen on incentive systems, trying to 
understand the conflict as a ‘war system’ (Richani 1997), where the protagonists of the war 
are motivated by their economic gains. Indeed, the Colombian conflict is fuelled in good 
measure by coca and other illegal activities like kidnapping and racketeering, without which it 
would not be sustainable. The calculations of the National Department of Planning and other 
agencies and commissions show – even factoring in the weakness of some of them – that the 
income of the guerrillas is huge27. This, unfortunately, does not solve the Fearon puzzle.  If 
the income is so good, why not enjoy it peacefully?  These types of goods are divisible, so 
bargaining about their distribution should not be so difficult.  Indeed, currently in Colombia 
several agents are able to do so – and avoid incurring the huge costs and risks of war. Also, 
how can the multiple peace processes be explained?  Why do rent seekers suddenly decide to 
abandon their bad ways and come back to legality?  On the other hand, empirical evidence 
suggests that a very substantial portion of the guerrilla soldiers, who earn no salary, were 
previously employed in the legal or illegal sectors, with income levels above the average rural 
salary (Gutierrez 2008). 
 
Less spectacular incentive-related distributional issues have been left aside. For example, 
military service has also extended to ever newer layers of the population. However, in 
Colombia this has had no relevant egalitarian implications, mainly due to the fact that the rich 
and the middle classes can easily evade service28.  Given the growing size of the army, there 
must be some impact over employment. We also know that some patterns of action have a 
long range economic and political effect: for example, cattle ranchers have long been the 
main victims of kidnapping, while peasants in their turn are the main victims of massacres.   
 
Peru 
In Peru there was no peace accord; the state obtained a military victory.   Peruvian scholars 
claim, following the Truth Commission (2003), that the main distributional programme has a 
racist bias against the cholos, who were by far and large the preferred target of all the 
contenders: the war was racist.  This seems to be inexact; we are not speaking about 
motivational effects (at least not necessarily), but of patterns of action and impacts on 
organisational structures. The question is not purely terminological, because it bears upon the 
interpretation of the meaning of the war. 
 
The Peruvian Army had, as with the Colombian policy makers, a prophylactic redistribution 
obsession, but for different motives and with different traditions and implications. They had 
managed a reformist dictatorship (1968-1978) that implemented a basically successful 
agrarian reform.  In the 1980s, the Army switched from a scorched earth policy to one that 
combined repression with social policies.  Critically, the Peruvian army knew with whom to 
                                                 
27 I am not aware of a similar estimation about the paramilitary. 
28 It may be the case that wars in which these backward recruitment patterns appear are particularly “non-
Tillian”.    
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speak in the country – the layer of intermediate peasants created by the reform – and was keen 
to organise them.  This systematic use of peasant organisation against the guerrillas ultimately 
proved to be the key to the success of the Peruvian state.  Here the difference between Peru 
and Colombia appears to be related to the baseline: in the latter the state did not count on any 
sound and legal interlocutor, so it has acted in a vacuum; in the former the previous agrarian 
reform enabled it to create a social protective fabric supported by all political actors 
(including the legal left). 
 
Shining Path - a very brutal group - was much less embedded in the coca economy than its 
Colombian equivalents.  Its link with coca was regionally circumscribed, and restricted to the 
final years of the conflict. They were also not heavy users of tactics like kidnapping. As in 
Colombia, the guerrilla organisations were quite inert distributionally in the territories where 
they had influence, and were much more intent on the moral education of the people than on 
an egalitarian agenda (in Colombia, in some regions they have actually opposed 
redistributional drives promoted by grassroots organisations).  In Peru the guerrillas targeted 
quite brutally and systematically members of the legal left, cooperatives, etcetera – but also 
peasant markets and fairs, which were considered reactionary29. 
 
I believe the main distributional issue of the Peruvian conflict is a regional fracture, that is, a 
base-line problem. This fracture permitted the conflict to develop, and was not solved by it, 
nor by the post-conflict policies.  It seems that the protest vote is particularly strong in the 
region where the conflict developed: where the 1968 agrarian reform basically failed, where 
the liberal economic policies of the 1990s were unable to produce a take-off, and where 
malaise and disenfranchisement still prevail. Colombia and Peru may be highlighting the 
persistent importance of unresolved agrarian and territorial problems to understand the 
distributional logics of civil wars. 
 
Conclusions 
The proposition that Tillian wars – that is, wars that advance state building and improve 
human welfare in the long-run – are confined to an historical moment long since past is 
hardly credible given recent history. Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement in 
Uganda fought a guerrilla war culminating in a victory in 1986 that allowed a large part of the 
country to enjoy its longest period of peace and economic development since independence 
(Mutebi 2008a). The Rwanda Patriotic Front waged a war against an exclusionary Hutu-
dominated regime and achieved victory after opponents in power carried out a massive 
genocide in 1994. It has since presided over a decade of peace in the country and provided the 
only possibility of beginning to build a more inclusive polity and a process of economic 
development (Mutebi 2008b). In Somaliland, war has led to the constitution of a state, still 
unrecognised by the international community, which appears to be providing both peace and 
prospects for development to inhabitants of its territory not possible since the colonial period 
(Ahmed and Green 1999). The theoretical possibility that the benefits of war may outweigh 
the costs must still inform our analysis of the costs of violence.  
 
There is a further complication.  Throughout this paper I have assumed that ‘civil war’ is a 
well-defined category. But is this true? There may be classificatory problems: providing an 
explicit definition of what a civil war is, can I tell with only marginal probability of error the 
positive events from the rest? There are in reality two types of problems here: first, separating 
                                                 
29 Here programmatic and repertoire driven effects blend. 
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wars from non-wars; and second, evaluating the consequences of different types of wars. For 
example, it may be the case that massive confrontation produces some types of effect, while 
low or medium intensity ones produce others (or none).  To illustrate this, I undertook the 
analysis of one type of violent event: military interventions. I used the military interventions 
dataset because it was already adequately ‘fuzzyfied’ – i.e. the ‘degree’ of the intensity of 
intervention was already captured in the coding30. The conclusion is quite intuitive: ‘big’ 
interventions (those beyond a degree of intensity of 0.7 over a maximum of 1) are more 
consequential than others31. Events such as the entry of the USSR into Afghanistan, or of the 
USA into Iraq have different consequences to, for example, hot pursuits across a border.  
While the first have a significant, high negative impact on the evolution of GNP per capita, 
the others have a non-significant, low, though still negative one.  This may sound self-
evident, but it is precisely the type of thing that costs-of-violence literature and other analyses 
are unable to capture, because they collapse all events, big and small, which may hide highly 
differentiated behaviours32. 
 
The costs-of-violence literature, in sum, has failed to address several key problems.  This 
might be the product of the predominance of a narrow liberal understanding of development 
and conflict (Cramer 2006) and the collapsing of economic and normative values (if it is bad 
it is expensive, and vice versa) – but also it may be  due to the lack of analytical checks and 
balances33. I have suggested here that the evaluation of the costs of violence (or of war) 
should distinguish three basic dimensions of analysis: bullionist, deadweight and distributive. 
The first one is threatened by inexact data and poor inference (in the double sense of using 
non-random data sets to extract probabilistic conclusions and to produce incomplete 
accountabilities as if they were genuine deadweights).  The second one is as yet to be solidly 
identified, but it is the most promising, provided base lines, counterfactuals and growth 
models are adequately built.  The third one is by far the least explored, and seems to offer 
several complications that have not been taken on board.  All three share some serious 
challenges that the costs-of-violence literature has basically ignored.  For example, lack of 
specification (what can the term ‘cost’ mean when we are speaking about impacts that span 
several generations); severe classificatory issues (whether there are differential effects 
according to the magnitude or type of armed conflict); global impacts (do deadweights 
vanish, or are they transferred from one nation to another); trade offs (how to evaluate costs 
when a generation sacrifices economic well-being so that another one obtains political rights). 
Employing a more careful approach to assessing the costs of war may help in understanding 
why actors resort to war, and why and how war may counter-intuitively lead to patterns of 
increased growth and welfare – at least for some people in some places at particular moments 
in history. Most importantly, if attempts to measure the costs of violence and war are placed 
on a sounder footing they might better be able to contribute to policy interventions that allow 
all actors, as Fearon’s rationalist puzzle puts it, to deduce post-war outcomes and thus strike 
bargains without incurring the human costs of war. 
                                                 
30 Instead of the habitual dummy. For an in depth discussion of the classificatory problem, see Gutiérrez and 
González,2008 
31 This is still incomplete, because I am using only one differentiating criterion, magnitude. 
32 In the case of invasions, analysts take all of them together, without separating big and small ones, and 
consequently find that they have no economic effect. See for example Gutiérrez and González,2008. 
33 The data is poor and as suggested above can be wrong by orders of magnitude; nobody is held responsible for 




Abadie, Alberto and Gardeazabal, Javier. 2003. ‘The economic costs of conflict: A case study 
of the Basque country’, American Economic Review 93(1): 113-132. 
Ahmed, I. and Green, R. H. 1999. ‘The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and 
Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction’, Third World 
Quarterly 20(1): 113-127. 
Ammons, Lila. 1996. ‘Consequences of War on African Countries’ Social and Economic 
Development’, African Studies Review 39(1): 67-82. 
Ball, Patrick. 1996. Who did what to whom? New York: American Association for the 
Advancement of Science 
Ball, Patrick. 2001. ‘Making the Case: The Role of Statistics in Human Rights Reporting’, 
Statistical Journal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 18(2-3):163-174. 
Cárdenas, Mauricio. 2007. ‘Economic growth in Colombia: a reversal of ‘fortune’?’ 
FEDESARROLLO Working Papers Series 36. 
CEDE. 2003. ‘Crecimiento Departamental y Violencia Criminal en Colombia’ Universidad 
de los Andes, Documento CEDE 2003-12. 
Centeno, Miguel. 2003. Blood and debt. War and the nation state in Latin America. 
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press. 
CERAC. 2006. La hidra de Colombia: las múltiples caras de la violencia armada. Bogotá: 
CERAC. 
Collier, Paul. 1999. ‘On the economic consequences of civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 
51:168-183. 
Collier, Paul, Elliot, V. L., Hegre, Havard, Hoeffler, Anke, Reynal-Querol, Marta and 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2003. Guerra civil y políticas de desarrollo: cómo escapar de la trampa 
del conflicto. Washington DC: Banco Mundial-Alfaomega. 
Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56(4): 563-595. 
Comisión Especial del Senado. 1989. ‘ Violencia y pacificación . Comisión Especial del 
Senado sobre las Causas de la Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación en el Perú. ’  Lima : 
DESCO. 
Cramer, Cristopher. 2006. Civil war is not a stupid thing. Accounting for violence in 
developing countries. London: C. Hurst and Co. 
CVR. 2003. Comisión de la Verdad y la Reparación. Informe Final. Lima. 
De Mesquita, Bruno. 1983. ‘The costs of war: a rational expectations approach’, The 
American Political Science Review 77(2): 347-357. 
DESCO. 1989. Estudio Violencia y pacificación, Comisión Especial del Senado, Lima: 
DESCO, Comisión Andina de Juristas. 
DNP. 1998. ‘Análisis de las relaciones entre violencia y equidad’, Archivos de 
Macroeconomía, Documento 093. 
Elster, Jon. 1985. Sour grapes. Studies on the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 25 
 
Fearon, James. 1995. ‘Rationalist explanations of war’,  International Organization 49(3): 
379-414. 
Fielding, David. 2004. ‘How does violent conflict affect investment location decisions? 
Evidence from Israel during the Intifada’, Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 465-484. 
Gonzalez Peña, Andrea Del Pilar. 2007. ‘Impacto de la Desmovilisación y Desarme sobre el 
Conflicto: Desplazamiento Forzado y Homicidio Político’, Masters thesis, Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia. 
  
Gutiérrez. 2008. “Telling the difference: guerrillas and paramilitaries in the Colombian war”, 
Politics and Society 36 (1): 3-34 
 Hardinghaus, Nicolás H. 1989. ‘Droga y crecimiento económico: El narcotráfico en las 
cuentas nacionales’, Nueva Sociedad 102: 94-106. 
Hazem, Adam Ghobarah, Huth, Paul and Russett Bruce. 2003. ‘Civil wars kill and maim 
people long after the shooting stops’, American Political Science Review 97(2): 189-202. 
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1987. Las consecuencias económicas de la paz. Barcelona: Editorial 
Crítica. 
Knight, Malcolm, Loayza, Norman and Villanueva, Delano. 1999. ‘The peace dividend: 
Military spending cuts and economic growth’, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 43. 
Leander, A. 2004. ‘Wars and the unmaking of states: Taking Tilly seriously in the 
contemporary world’, in S. Guzzini and D. Jung (eds), Contemporary Security Analysis and 
Copenhagen Peace Research. London: Routledge. 
Logan, J. and Preble, C. 2006. ‘Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing 
Nation-Building Office’, Policy Analysis 560. 
Luttwak, Edward. 1999. ‘Give war a chance’, Foreign Affairs 78(4): 36-44. 
Martinez Ortiz, Astrid. 2001. ‘Análisis económico de la Violencia en Colombia. Una nota 
sobre la Literatura’, Cuadernos de Economía 34, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Mitchell, C. R. 1980. ‘Evaluating conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 17(1): 61-75. 
Moore, Barrington. 1993. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and peasant in 
the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Mutebi, Frederick Golooba. 2008a. ‘Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An 
analytical narrative on state-making’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series Two) 27, London: 
London School of Economics. 
Mutebi, Frederick Golooba. 2008b. ‘Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Rwanda: An 
analytical narrative on state-making’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series Two) 28, London: 
London School of Economics 
North, Douglass. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Olson, Mancur. 2000. Power and prosperity. Outgrowing communist and capitalist 
dictatorships. New York: Basic Books. 
Otero, Diego. 2007. Las cifras del conflicto Colombiano. Bogotá: Indepaz y Uniciencia. 
 26 
 
Perez, Ricardo, Vergará, Andrés and Lahuerta, Yilberto. 2002. ‘Aproximación metodológica 
y cuantitativa de los costos económicos generados por el problema de las drogas ilícitas en 
Colombia (1995 - 2000)’, Archivos de Economía Documento 185, Bogotá: Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación. 
Pinto, María Eugenia, Vergara, Andrés and Lahuerta, Yilberto. 2004. Costos generados por 
la violencia armada en Colombia: 1999-2000. Bogotá: Grupo de Estudios de Gobierno y 
Asuntos Internos de la Dirección de Justicia y Seguridad del Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación. 
Postan, M. M. 1964. ‘The cost of the Hundred Years’ War’, Past and Present 27: 34-53. 
Przeworski, Adam- .2003. States and markets. A primer in political economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Richani, Nazih. 1997. ‘The political economy of violence: the war system in Colombia’, 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 39(2): 37-81. 
Rossiter, William. 1916. ‘The statistical side of the economic costs of war’, American 
Economic Review 6(1): 94-117. 
Rubio, Mauricio. 1995. ‘Crimen y crecimiento en Colombia’, Coyuntura económica 25(1): 
101-104. 
Sánchez , Fabio. 2003. ‘Conflicto, violencia y actividad criminal en Colombia: un análisis 
espacial?’ Archivos de Economía Documento 219, Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación. 
Schumpeter, J. 1951. Imperialism and the Social Classes. New York: Kelley. 
Snyder, Richard. 2004. ‘Does lootable conflict breed disorder?’, Working Paper 312, 
University of Notre Dame. 
Tilly, Charles. 1975. ‘Reflections on the History of European State making’, in Charles Tilly 
(ed.), The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, capital, and European States – AD 990-1992. Blackwell, 
Cambridge. 
Tilly, Charles. 2003. The politics of collective violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Truth Commission (2003).Truth Commission and  Reconciliation. Final Report. Lima 
Whitman, David. 1979. ‘How a war ends. A rational model approach’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 23(4): 743-763. 
Wood, Elisabeth. 2000. Forging democracy from below. Insurgent Transitions in South 
Africa and El Salvador. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank. 2007. Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in 






CSRC Series 2 Working Papers 
 
WP1 James Putzel, ‘War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme’ 
(September 2005) 
WP2 Simonetta Rossi and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-
combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities’, (June 2006) 
WP3 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel, ‘Political and Economic Foundations of 
State making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction’, (July 2006) 
WP4 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Genesis of a Prince: the rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992’ 
(September 2006) 
WP5 Laurie Nathan, ‘No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement’,  (September 2006) 
WP6 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, ‘The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984’ (September 2006) 
WP7 Antonio Giustozzi, “Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005’ (September 2006) 
WP8 Joe Hanlon, Sean Fox, ‘Identifying Fraud in Democratic Elections: a case study of the 2004 Presidential 
election in Mozambique’ 
WP9 Jo Beall, ‘Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century’, (February 2007) 
WP10 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Slum Wars of the 21st Century: the new geography of conflict in Central America’, 
(February 2007) 
WP11 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Missing Ingredient: non-ideological insurgency and state collapse in Western 
Afghanistan 1979-1992’, (February 2007) 
WP12 Suzette Heald, ‘Making Law in Rural East Africa: SunguSungu in Kenya’, (March 2007) 
WP13 Anna Matveeva, ‘The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: unwilling playmates’, (March 2007) 
WP14 Sarah Lister, ‘Understanding State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan’, (June 2007) 
WP15 Pritha Venkatachalam, ‘Municipal Finance Systems in Conflict Cities: case studies on Ahmedabad and 
Srinagar, India’, (July 2007) 
WP16 Jason Sumich, ‘The Illegitimacy of Democracy? democratisation and alienation in Maputo, 
Mozambique’, (September 2007) 
WP17 Scott Bollens, ‘Comparative Research on Contested Cities: lenses and scaffoldings’, (October 2007) 
WP18 Debby Potts, ‘The State and the informal in sub-Saharan African economies: revisiting debates on 
dualism’, (October 2007) 
WP19 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Tatiana Acevedo and Juan Manuel Viatela, 'Violent liberalism? State, 
 conflict,  and political regime in Colombia, 1930-2006: an analytical narrative on state-making', 
 (November 2007) 
WP20 Stephen Graham,  'RoboWar TM Dreams: Global South Urbanisation and the US  
 Military’s ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’', (November 2007) 
WP21  Gabi Hesselbein, 'The Rise and Decline of the Congolese State: an analytical narrative on state-making', 
(November 2007) 
WP22 Diane Davis, 'Policing, Regime Change, and Democracy: Reflections from the Case of Mexico', 
(November 2007) 
WP23    Jason Sumich, 'Strong Party, Weak State? Frelimo and State Survival Through the Mozambican Civil 
War: an analytical narrative on state-making', (December 2007) 
WP24 Elliott Green, 'District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda', (January 2008) 
WP25    Jonathan DiJohn, ' Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of     
              the Literature', (January 2008)  
WP26  James Putzel, Stefan Lindemann and Claire Schouten, 'Drivers of Change in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo: The Rise and Decline of the State and Challenges For Reconstruction - A Literature Review', 
(January 2008) 
WP27 Frederick Golooba Mutebi, 'Collapse, war and reconstruction in Uganda: An analytical narrative on 
state-making', (January 2008) 
WP28 Frederick Golooba Mutebi, 'Collapse, war and reconstruction in Rwanda: An analytical narrative on 
state-making', (February 2008) 
WP29 Bjørn Møller, 'European Security: the role of the European Union', (February 2008) 
WP30 Bjørn Møller, 'European Security: The Role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe', (February 2008) 
WP31     Laurie Nathan, 'Anti-imperialism Trumps Human Rights: South Africa’s Approach to the Darfur  
              Conflict', (February 2008)  
WP32 Ben Moxham, 'State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-
Leste', (February 2008) 
 28 
 
WP33 Kripa Sridharan, ‘Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: comparing ASEAN and SAARC’, 
(March 2008) 
WP34 Monica Herz, ‘Does the Organisation of American States Matter?’ (April 2008) 
WP35 Deborah Fahy Bryceson, ‘Creole and Tribal Designs: Dar es Salaam and Kampala as Ethnic Cities in 
Coalescing Nation States 
WP36 Adam Branch, ‘Gulu Town in War and Peace: displacement, humanitarianism and post-war crisis’ (April 2008) 
WP37 Dennis Rodgers, ‘An Illness called Managua’ (May 2008) 
WP38 Rob Jenkins, ‘The UN peacebuilding commission and the dissemination of international norms’ (June 
2008) 
WP39 Antonio Giustozzi and Anna Matveeva, ‘The SCO: a regional organisation in the making’ (September 
2008) 
WP40 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Afghanistan: transition without end’ (November 2008) 
WP41 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, ‘At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil War in Hazarajat’ (January 2009) 
WP42 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, ‘Divide and Rule: state penetration in Hazarajat, from monarchy to the Taliban’ 
(January 2009) 
WP43 Daniel Esser, ‘Who Governs Kabul? Explaining urban politics in a post-war capital city’ (February 
2009) 
WP44 Francisco Gutierrez et al, ‘Politics and Security in Three Colombian Cities’ (March 2009) 
WP45 Marco Pinfari, ‘Nothing but Failure?  The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators 
in Middle Eastern Conflicts’ (March 2009) 
WP46 Anna Matveeva, ‘The Perils of Emerging Statehood: civil war and state reconstruction in Tajikistan’ 
 (March 2009) 
WP47 Jennifer Giroux, David Lanz and  Damiano Sguaitamatti, ‘The Tormented Triangle: the regionalisation 
 of conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic’ (April 2009) 
 
These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com), where an up-to-date list of all 
our publications including Discussion Papers, Occasional Papers and Series 1 Working Papers can be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
